pleading defendant consists primarily of informed plea negotiation with the prosecution and only secondarily of formal plea acceptance proceedings.
The Supreme Court has sanctioned plea bargaining, 6 and, with the exception of recognizing the possibility of coercion during the negotiations, 7 has done so by ignoring the realities of this unsupervised practice. The Court assumes that plea negotiations are conducted fairly. Consequently, the Court enforces plea agreements in a manner reminiscent of the now discredited "freedom of contract" decisions of the late nineteenth century; the defendant is held to his bargain as long as the apparent inequities do not approach unconscionable proportions. Ironically, the "due process revolution" of the Warren Court 8 focused on the relatively small percentage of criminal defendants who stand trial, 9 but for the defendant who pleads guilty those decisions at best have meant that he has more rights with which to negotiate. The Court's principal contribution to due process for the guilty pleading defendant is Boykin v. Alabama,' 0 a judicial gloss on the formal plea acceptance proceeding.
One of the principal aspects of unfairness in plea bargaining is the defendant's inability to obtain pertinent information known only to the prosecution. While being told which rights are waived by a guilty plea is useful to the defendant, it is of little value to the defendant and his counsel if lack of relevant information prevents them from a reasoned decision whether to plead guilty or to stand trial. The type of information that would aid the defense in this decision includes all items relevant to an assessment of the prosecution's case against the defendant. Ideally, this information would be available to the defense through regular preplea discovery." Most important, the Court's decision in Brady v. Marland 12 should be interpreted to require prosecutorial disclosure of all favorable evidence material to the issue of guilt or punishment, or to the informed decision to waive the right to trial. Postconviction challenges to guilty pleas that are grounded in nondisclosure in violation of Brady v. Maland are rare, probably because many violations prior to the entry of a plea go undiscovered.' 3 The Supreme Court has never resolved the question of whether a Brady violation is cognizable by a court in a postconviction proceeding notwithstanding a guilty plea. United States v. Agurs,' 4 in which the Court set forth the standards of materiality to be used in applying the Brady rule, arguably determines the showing of materiality the guilty pleading defendant must make to fit the withheld evidence within the Brad rule.1 5 However, because none of the Court's decisions concerning the prosecutorial duty to disclose dealt with a guilty plea, this question remains open. An analysis of the small body of law dealing with the validity of guilty pleas preceded by Brady violations reveals a judicial attempt to resolve questions presented by the overlap of two areas of the law: the prosecutorial duty to disclose' 6 and the waiver of constitutional rights by a guilty plea. Four different yet interrelated models can be used to analyze the question of whether a Brady v. Maland violation is a valid basis for a court to vacate a guilty plea, and if so, what the standard of materiality of the evidence withheld should be. First, a plea of guilty preceded by the prosecutor's failure to disclose material and favorable evidence is unintelligent because the defendant and his counsel lacked sufficient information to make a reasoned decision whether to plead guilty or stand trial.18 Second, "lisgo e in"ra idclaimounded in Brady v. Maitland are forfeited by a guilty plea, which cures the due process violation, thereby enabling the state to proceed against the defendant once again.' 9 Third, a guilty plea notes 65-74 infra. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, which addresses the standards for plea bargaining will be referred to by the words "Brady trilogy," which also includes Parker v. Fourth, the prosecutorial duty under Brady v. Magland can be interpreted as an essential element of due process, which cannot be waived by a guilty plea nor made dependent upon a specific defense request.
2 '
In order to provide the necessary background for a discussion of these four models, Part II of this comment will discuss plea negotiation as an institution and will criticize the Court's erroneous assumptions regarding negotiated pleas. Part III will discuss the prosecutorial duty to disclose as defined by Brady v. Marland 22 and United States v. Agurs . 23 In addition, criminal defense discovery as a solution to the problem of prosecutorial withholding of material and favorable evidence will be examined. Part IV will use the four models to analyze the application of the Brady v. Magland rule to postconviction attacks on pleas of guilty.
II. PLEA BARGAINING Guilty pleas obtained through bargains struck between the prosecution and the defense are the predominant means of conviction in state and federal courts. 24 Administrative convenience is the easiest explanation for the high rate of guilty plea convictions; the criminal justice system cannot afford to give every defendant a trial 2 5 While the United States Supreme Court 26 and institutions such as the American Bar Association 2 7 have sanctioned plea bargaining, the academic community has vociferously disapproved of the practice. 28 One critic of plea bargaining contends that the Court has an overly optimistic view of the situation, 20 See text accompanying notes 186-99 infra. 21 See text accompanying notes 201-38 infra. 22 Alschuler (1979) , supra note 9, at 33. 25 The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called "plea bargaining," is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were to be subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 260. The Court's statement inspired this rejoinder.
[T]he view that plea bargaining is an "economic necessity" would gain plausibility if one concluded that this shortcut to conviction had been employed for as long as there had been trials, and even more clearly, the claim of economic necessity would become strained if one concluded that the Anglo-American legal system had survived without plea bargaining during most of its existence. Alschuler (1979) , supra note 9, at 2. 28 Plea bargaining has had an unsavory reputation in academic circles since the 1920s and has insulated negotiated pleas from later attack by making unrealistic assumptions.
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The Court assumes that informal plea negotiations are conducted fairly. It has therefore ignored this decisive stage of the pleading process while devoting its attention to the formal entry of the plea, which is enveloped in procedural protections. 30 The supposed fairness of plea negotiations appears to be rooted in two troublesome assumptions made by the Court. The first assumption is that all defendants who plead guilty would be convicted if they stood trial. The second is that a defendant's plea is voluntary and intelligent if his counsel is present when the plea is entered. 3 ' The realities of plea bargaining refute both of these assumptions.
The Court's assumption that all guilty pleading defendants would be convicted if they stood trial is implicit in Santobello v. New York 32 and Brady v. United States. 3 3 In Brady, the Court stated: "We would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves. ' 3 4 This notion that the guilty pleading defendant would be convicted at trial where he would receive a higher sentence than that which he bargained for is unwarranted because both the prosecutor and the defendant are adverse to taking unnecessary risks. The strength or weakness of the state's case is the prosecutor's main consideration in plea bargaining; therefore, the majority of prosecutors choose to negotiate pleas in cases where victory at trial is less than a certainty. 3 5 Given the lack of sufficient resources to prosecute and punish all offenders, the prosecutor's initial decision to charge a defendant means that he has made his own judgment that the defendant can be proven guilty of a crime. The proswhen the practice, by that time commonplace, first came to public attention. Alschuler (1979) , supra note 9, at 26-32. 29 A pervasive criticism of the Court's opinions in the Brady trilogy can be found in Al- [Vol. 72 ecutor, and often the defense counsel, assumes throughout the plea negotiations that the defendant is guilty of a crime very nearly approximating that charged in the original indictment. 3 6 The prosecutor simply bargains harder where his case against the defendant is weaker. Professor Alschuler noted this practice of offering more concessions in bargaining where the state's case is weaker and commented that "the greatest pressures to plead guilty are brought to bear on defendants who may be innocent. The universal rule is that the sentence differential between guilty plea and trial defendants increases in direct proportion to the likelihood of acquittal. '37 Prosecutors disagree that innocent people plead guilty, principally because they believe that innocent persons are unlikely to be swayed by any pressure to avoid trial. 38 The defendant seeks to avoid risk in that his principal objective after arrest is to minimize the uncertainty of what will happen to him.
39
The defendant will therefore be willing to accept the certainty of a low sentence or probation rather than risk a trial where the statutory maximum sentence might be imposed upon conviction. 40 This observation is supported by Michael Finkelstein's empirical study of guilty plea practices in twenty-nine federal district courts, in which he concluded that nearly one-third of defendants who plead guilty would be found innocent if they stood trial. 4 ' Therefore, while plea negotiation is a viable 36 M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 100 (1970) . Overcharging with an eye toward reducing the charge to the crime the prosecutor believes the defendant has committed is common in state and federal plea negotiations. "Vertical" overcharging, more common in state courts, is where the defendant is charged with the most serious crime he conceivably could have committed. "Horizontal" overcharging, more often found in federal courts, may be a multiplicitous indictment that comes within statutory bounds. An offer to reduce charges or to dismiss charges against a defendant is a more effective guarantee of sentencing leniency, where there are statutory minimum and maximum sentences, than is the prosecutor's promise to make a sentencing recommendation. Alschuler (1968) (1976) . 40 With regard to sentencing disparities between defendants accused of similar crimes, the more demands a defendant makes upon the resources and time of both judge and prosecutor, the longer his sentence will be upon conviction. Thus a guilty pleading defendant will be sentenced more leniently than one who stands trial before the bench, who will in turn be punished less severely than his unfortunate counterpart who demands a jury trial. 293 (1975) . This analysis concerns the defendant's chances of being found innocent at trial, regardless of his actual guilt or innocence. By assuming what he called an "implicit rate of non-conviction" representing the proportion of guilt pleading defendants who would have been acquitted had they stood trial, Finkelstein estimated that one-third of all guilty pleading defendants in districts with high rates of guilty pleas would have been found innocent had they stood trial. Id at 309.
alternative to the risks of trial for both sides, it is not a substitute for trial. A plea of guilty does not mean that a like result would be obtained at trial. The Court's equation of guilty plea with conviction at trial is thus unrealistic.
The Court's second problematic assumption is that a plea is voluntarily and intelligently entered if counsel is present. 42 In the Brad trilogy of cases, the Court framed the issue as whether a guilty plea induced by a coerced confession, 43 or by the possible imposition of the death penalty, 44 is voluntary and intelligent if the defendant has received the assistance of counsel. The basic flaw in the Court's position, according to one observer, is the assumption that defense aLttorneys always have their clients' best interests in mind, 45 an opinion which reflects an unduly optimistic view of "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. ' 46 Justice Brennan's dissent in Mc~lann v. Richardson 47 articulates a different view that is closer to reality. His dissent implies that the defense attorney finds that his own best interests are usually furthered if he encourages his clients to plead guilty. Since the defense attorney works with the same prosecutors and the same judges on a continuing basis, he finds that cooperation with a prosecutor who wants to deal, or a judge who wants to avoid trial, is more to his continuing advantage than affording an individual defendant the full measure of vigorous advocacy.
4 8 Perhaps the most appalling feature of this cooperative system is the reluctance of the defense attorney who has a good working relationship with the prosecutor's office and the court to press any constitutional claims that the defendant might have except as bargaining chips to obtain concessions in plea negotiations. role it assigns to counsel are, in my view, entirely incorrect, for it cannot be blandly assumed, without further discussion, that counsel will be able to render effective assistance to the defendant in freeing him from the burdens of his unconstitutionally extorted confession.
Moreover, a defense attorney who knows of a weakness in the prosecutor's case against his client can use this knowledge to obtain concessions in plea bargaining. The prosecutor's power to withhold evidence or deny discovery privileges to the defense becomes crucial where his case is flawed, because he has an incentive to conceal the flaw in order to obtain a guilty plea. On the other hand, a prosecutor with a strong case will find that opening his file to the defense will encourage a guilty plea.
Professor Alschuler noted that opportunities for preplea discovery were conditioned not only upon the strength of the state's case, 5 0 but also upon defense counsel's rapport with the prosecutor's office, 5 ' and upon concessions by defense counsel, such as divulging his client's confidences 52 or agreeing that what he discovers will not be used at trial.
53
Other observers agree with this description of informal discovery practices. 54 Alschuler concludes that these circumstances provide a rationale for granting broad defense discovery as a matter of right in order to prevent these questionable practices.
55
The consequences of the failure of a prosecutor to disclose material and favorable evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea are magnified because the trial judge is unlikely to discern exculpating circumstances in assessing the validity of the plea. Given his tremendous workload, the trial judge is just as interested in disposing of cases by guilty plea as is the prosecutor. He is, therefore, not especially disposed to giving every guilty plea the "penetrating and comprehensive examination" 56 contemplated by the Court in Boykin v. Alabama.
57
Guilty pleas are usually heard in a very short session in which the judge asks the defendant a set of ritual questions to which he receives a series of monosyllabic answers. Moreover, the trial judge is unlikely ever to be confronted with any irregularity in the plea because the parties have come to him with a prepared agreement, expecting no more than his stamp of approval. As one commentator put it, "At this late stage in the bargaining process, the interests of the prosecutor and defendant are no longer adverse. Instead, they have a joint commitment to the success of the plea bargain they have shaped. The parties therefore seek to present to the judge a facade of scrupulous regularity.
' 58 Thus the worst fears of Justice Brennan in his dissent in McMann v. Richardson 5 9 are founded in fact. The trial judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney work together in the business of convicting defendants by means of negotiated pleas. The Court misconstrues the defense attorney's role in this cooperative system by presuming that representation by counsel ensures the voluntariness and intelligence of the defendant's plea of guilty. Due in part to the Court's unrealistic assumption of fairness in plea negotiation, the plea bargaining defendant has little in the way of procedural protection. 6° While the Court made great strides in criminal procedure during the Warren era, its decisions concerning guilty pleas have had the effect of sequestering the negotiated plea from later collateral attack. 6 ' Permeating the Court's opinions in the Brad trilogy 62 are the notions that all defendants who plead guilty surely would be convicted at trial, and that the presence of defense counsel mitigates against unconstitutional pressures to plead guilty.
As the discussion of informal discovery during plea negotiation showed, the extent of informal discovery privileges accorded the defense for the plea, rather than specific admonitions. depends on a number of factors. 63 Chief among these factors appears to be the strength of the state's case against the defendant. The prosecutor's file is open if it will encourage a guilty plea. The prosecutor's ability to grant and withhold discovery privileges in this manner demonstrates that the level of disclosure to the defense profoundly affects the defendant's decision whether to plead guilty or to stand trial. The next section will examine the protections accorded the guilty pleading defendant by the Court's decisions on prosecutorial disclosure and by the formal discovery rules of state and federal jurisdictions.
III.
PREPLEA DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE [Vol. 72 request violates due process where the evidence is material either to the guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 6 8 On its face, the Brady rule seems straightforward. The rule departed from the Court's prior intentional suppression cases 6 9 by alleviating the need to consider the prosecutor's intent to suppress evidence. Read in accordance with the facts of Brada, the rule states that the prosecutor must disclose favorable, material evidence upon receiving a specific request for particular pieces of evidence from the defense.
70
Material evidence is defined as evidence which would create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. 7 ' The Court based its decision on the due process clause, 72 reasoning that a criminal defendant cannot have a fair trial if he is prejudiced by the withholding of material evidence in his favor.
Lower courts inconsistently applied Brady v. Magland's specific request 73 and materiality 74 requirements for thirteen years before the Court attempted to explain Brady in United Slates v. Agurs. 5 In Agurs, the Court categorized situations demanding the application of the Brady rule where the defense made a specific request, a general request, or no request at all. 76 A general request for material and favorable evidence, the Court stated, is the functional equivalent of no request at all.
77
If there is a duty to respond to a general request ... it must derive from the obviously exculpatory character of certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutor. But if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty should equally arise if no request is made. Thus the Court imposed a high standard of materiality upon a defendant alleging prosecutorial withholding after he has entered a general request for material and favorable evidence or has made no request. In such situations, the standard of materiality is whether the withheld evidence would have created a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
79
The conviction stands if the defendant fails to make this showing.
No Supreme Court decision addresses the right of the guilty pleading defendant to preplea prosecutorial disclosure of material and favorable evidence. Assuming the usual case of the defendant who, prior to entering a guilty plea, has made a general request for Brad material or no request at all, the question becomes whether the standard of materiality demanded by United States v. Agurs should be required of the guilty pleading defendant, or whether a lower standard of materiality is more appropriate. Agurs can be applied in two ways to this situation of the usual guilty pleading defendant. First, the standard of whether the evidence creates reasonable doubt of guilt can be applied. Second, Agurs may be construed to call for a sliding scale of standards for diffferent classes of defendants.
The reasonable doubt standard of materiality has often been applied by lower courts faced with postconviction challenges to guilty pleas based on Brady violations. 8 0 However, this standard is impossible to apply where there has not been a trial. An appellate judge can only decide whether the undisclosed evidence creates a reasonable doubt of guilt if he can consider it in light of all the other evidence. Because there has been no trial, none of the evidence has been adequately developed or tested. In essence, the reviewing court applying the reasonable doubt standard is trying the case for the first time. Thus the defendant's constitutional claims are being determined by an exercise in judicial hindsight.
Moreover, the reasonable doubt standard is too vigorous a standard to be imposed on a defendant who chooses to forego the procedural safe-
[I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. Id at 112-13 (footnote omitted). Perhaps a quest for certainty in the application of the prosecutor's duty to disclose has engendered this literal reading of Agurs. A desire for certainty in the test for which evidence is material should not, however, blind courts to the rationale underlying the duty to disclose which is fairness to the defendant.
[Vol. 72 guards of a trial. Indeed, this standard may be too harsh even for a defendant who has had a trial and later asserts a Brady violation. Justice Fortas articulated this position in his concurring opinion in Giles v. Mar,-land. 81 Arguing for an expansive interpretation of the materiality requirement, he stated:
The State's obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible, truth emerges. This is also the ultimate statement of its responsibility to provide a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. No respectable interest of the State is served by its concealment of information which is material, generously conceived, to the case, including all possible defenses.
8 2
Justice Fortas went on to qualify his statement by saying that the nondisclosure of evidence which is merely cumulative or repetitious should not be grounds for setting aside a conviction. 8 3 Clearly, Justice Fortas' concern was whether the prosecution or the reviewing court might miss some piece of evidence which would be useful to the defense. 8 4 Hence Justice Fortas would interpret the Brady v. Magland rule in a way that would best prevent prejudice to the defendant, rather than in terms of meeting stringent materiality requirements. The application of the reasonable doubt standard to the guilty pleading defendant asserting a Brady violation after entering a general request or no request is so harsh that the purpose of the Brady rule, fairness to the defendant, is frustrated.
Under the second approach to materiality determination, Agurs can be read as calling for a sliding scale of standards of materiality for different classes of defendants rather than as imposing strict requirements. 85 All convicted criminal defendants who assert that the prosecutor withheld material and favorable evidence can be placed on a continuum of 81 386 U.S. at 96-102 (Fortas, J., concurring). 82 Id at 98. Justice Fortas also argued against the specific request requirement, an argument best articulated in Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842: "In gauging the nondisclosure in terms of due process, the focus must be on the essential fairness of the procedure and not on the astuteness of either counsel." Id at 846. 83 One commentator agrees that the line should be drawn here, stating: Fairness requires that the defendant be given favorable evidence of any probative value on the question of guilt or punishment, whether relevant to building a defense or to undermining the prosecutor's case. . . .
[W]henever the prosecutor has failed to disclose relevant information to the defense, the courts should not hesitate to find error. This does not necessarily mean that a conviction need be reversed when the prosecutor has innocently overlooked truly insignificant bits of evidence. Comment, supra note 74, at 132. 84 386 U.S. at 99 (Fortas J., concurring).
[T]
he significance of Agurs is that a court or prosecutor can rank-order the defendant's burden of proving unfairness according to the situation in which a particular nondisclosure occurred. That is, the majority opinion can be interpreted as a means of comparing "how much" a defendant must prove in order to establish materiality in accordance with the circumstances under which the nondisclosure occurred. 
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required showings of materiality. Those convicted at trial would be held to the high standards of materiality required by Agurs in the specific request, general request, and no request categories. Those convicted by pleas of guilty would be ranked among themselves according to the three request categories. No guilty pleading defendant, however, would be held to the standards that Agurs requires of defendants who stood trial, because a plea conviction involves a waiver of the right to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the standard of materiality should be lower in all cases where there has been a plea conviction because neither side has had the opportunity to present evidence.
A lower standard of materiality for guilty pleading defendants would encompass evidence that relates to the defendant's decision whether to plead or to stand trial, even though the evidence may not necessarily constitute traditional Brady material. Because the BradyAgurs standard of materiality is based on the notion that the withheld evidence would have affected the trial outcome, the standard presumes that the question of whether to go to trial has already been answered. Therefore, "traditional" Brady material and favorable evidence is exculpatory evidence. This includes evidence related to an element of the offense, 8 6 to a legal excuse, 8 7 or a justification for the crime, or to an illegal search and seizure of evidence. 88 Courts have found Brady violations where evidence relating to these examples was not disclosed to defendants who later entered pleas of guilty. 89 Certain types of evidence, however, are highly pertinent to an informed decision whether to plead guilty or to stand trial, yet would not be cognizable as Brady material under the Agurs reasonable doubt standard. Evidence of the defendant's incompetence to stand trial 9° would fit into this category. Incompetency is more easily recognized at a trial, which can be suspended for a competency hearing, than at a brief arraignment where a plea is entered. Similarly, evidence, which for trial purposes would be termed "tactical" or "merely cumulative," may be important to the defendant and his counsel when making a choice between a guilty plea and a trial. Since this choice is essentially a strategic decision, the withholding of strategic evidence should be cognizable as a Brady violation. Examples of tactical evidence affecting the decision to plead include information that the complaining witness had died, 9 [Vol. 72 information which .would aid the defense in impeaching the credibility of a prosecution witness at trial. 92 Nonetheless, a standard of materiality that calls for disclosure of all evidence relating to the defendant's decision whether to plead guilty or stand trial is indefinite and difficult to apply. This standard could open the doors to every defendant seeking to set aside his guilty plea on the ground that some trivial piece of information was withheld. Furthermore, this standard could be construed to require the prosecutor to sort through all of the largely neutral and irrelevant information in his files in order to find evidence which would affect a decision to plead.
Yet a lower standard of materiality mandating disclosure of evidence directly affecting the defendant's decision whether to plead guilty or stand trial is a logical extension of the Brady principle. In the context of a trial, the prosecutor must disclose Brady material no later than at trial. 93 Most defendants never find out that material and favorable evidence has been withheld. 94 Disclosure of such evidence must precede the defendant's act of self-conviction 95 if his guilty plea is to be the product of an informed choice between self-conviction and trial. It is not sufficient that the defendant entering a plea merely be aware that he is waiving certain rights. Preplea disclosure of evidence directly affecting the decision to plead guilty would ensure that a guilty plea is an intelligent waiver of the defendant's right to trial. The possible difficulties in applying this standard, especially from the standpoint of the prosecutor, raise the question whether broad privileges of defense discovery would not be an easier way to achieve the same result.
B.
PREPLEA DISCOVERY
The Brad rule is not a rule of discovery, nor does it demand that there be any defense discovery at all. 9 6 The rule simply states that the prosecutor must disclose material and favorable evidence to the defense "Many authorities have announced without analysis that there is no constitutional right to defense discovery. The United States Supreme Court has strongly favored defense discov-before trial. The question to be discussed in this section is whether the adoption of procedural rules permitting broad defense discovery would ensure compliance with the Brady rule.
Generally, criminal discovery for the defense has several perceived advantages. Given the greater investigative resources of the prosecutor, defense discovery equalizes the strategic contest between the prosecution and the defense. 97 In addition, defense discovery may encourage guilty pleas, 98 reduce the number of motions requesting information, 9 9 and generally impute a measure of fairness to pretrial processes that are determinative of the outcome of the formal proceedings. Arguments that defense counsel will use the discovered evidence to fabricate a defense, 1°° and that the defense should not be able to engage in a "fishing expedition,"
' 10 ' have been largely discredited.
Since Brady v. Maygland, many commentators have advocated a pretrial "open file" policy on the part of the prosecution to ensure that the defendant's right to prosecutorial disclosure of material and favorable evidence is observed. 1 0 2 Efforts to increase pretrial defense discovery are directed at the problem of "negligent nondisclosure."'1 0 3 Because the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor in failing to turn over material and favorable evidence to the defense is irrelevant under the Brady ery, but the Court's development of constitutional procedures to deliver it has been measured." Nakell, supra note 13, at 451 (footnotes omitted). 97 The possibility that a dishonest accused will misuse such an opportunity is no reason for committing the injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means of clearing himself. That argument is outworn; it was the basis (and with equal logic) for the one-time refusal of the criminal law to allow the accused to produce any witnesses at all. 6 J. WIGMORE 103 Note, supra note 97, at 909. The author observed that most Brady violations that are appealed are the result of negligence on the part of the prosecution, rather than intentional suppression. For an analysis, of some examples of negligent nondisclosure cases, see Nakell, supra note 13, at 452-60.
[Vol. 72 rule, 0 4 the Court was obviously concerned with negligent nondisclosure in formulating the rule. Addressing the negligent nondisclosure problem, one commentator has argued that broad defense discovery is mandated because the prosecutor should not be entrusted with the determination of which evidence must be furnished to the defendant under Brady v. Magyland.
5
The prosecutor should be relieved of responsibility for disclosure by means of liberal defense discovery for several reasons. The prosecutor's integrity has nothing to do with the negligent nondisclosure problem. 06 First, the demands of the prosecutor's workload and his role as an advocate make him unable to search his files for every piece of evidence that conceivably could be material and favorable to the defendant. If the prosecutor only moves to indict defendants that he believes can be proved guilty, 0 7 then he may decide close questions of materiality and favorableness in favor of nondisclosure) 0 8 Thus, his posture, heavy caseload, and massive files mean that total compliance with the Brady rule is expensive for the prosecutor in terms of time.
Second, the prosecutor cannot, and should not, be expected to prepare the defendant's case for him. He cannot be expected to view the evidence according to its usefulness to the defense because his posture as prosecutor gives him a biased view of the evidence. 1 0 9 Moreover, if the prosecutor is unfamiliar with defense counsel's theory of the case, he is unlikely to appreciate the strategic value of seemingly neutral information.
1 1 0 Two practitioners, Zagel and Carr, have argued that the problem of the prosecutor's inability to appreciate the defense value of information in his file can be alleviated by reciprocal discovery."' They assert that in instances where the materiality and favorableness of the evidence is in doubt, the prosecutor cannot decide whether to produce the evi- dence unless he has gained knowledge of the defense theories through discovery against the defense. Zagel and Carr further observe that defense discovery may serve to ensure that an adequate basis exists for a plea of guilty.
112
Nonetheless, broad defense discovery cannot be regarded as a panacea in implementing the Brady rule in the guilty plea context, nor in ensuring that pleas of guilty are intelligently entered. As Zagel and Carr point out:
A prosecutor acting in good faith, however, will comply with Brad even without discovery. If the prosecutor is not acting in good faith, he can hide the evidence even if there is discovery. Compliance with Brady cannot be secured by courtroom procedure alone; ultimately compliance will depend on the good faith of law enforcement personnel.
13
The extent to which procedural rules affording the defense discovery privileges may be undermined during plea negotiations is not known. However, as the discussion of plea bargaining in the previous section showed, a logical inference can be made that some dilution of discovery privileges is taking place during plea negotiation, given the extent of prosecutorial control over informal discovery. [Vol. 72
In People v. G-at,121 the defendant sought to withdraw his plea, alleging that the prosecutor withheld a codefendant's statements prior to his entry of a guilty plea but later presented these statements at the sentencing hearing. The defense had made a general request for discovery under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412.122 The court found that while the codefendant's statements were inculpatory and therefore were not Brady material, the prosecutor's failure to disclose this evidence violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412(a)(ii), which requires the prosecution to disclose all statements of codefendants on written motion.
123
In holding that the nondisclosure was harmless error, the court made no mention of this violation of state discovery rules. In United States v. Wolczik, 12s the defendant sought to vacate his plea, asserting that he had been denied discovery of the written statements of his coconspirators. The Court denied relief because the Jencks Act 126 and Rule 16127 preclude discovery of the statements of prospective government witnesses until they have testified at trial. The Court further found that the statements were not Brady material because the statements identified Wolczik as a coconspirator but did not exonerate him.128 Nonetheless, the Court stated that if the statements were Brady material, preplea disclosure arguably could be required.
129
Got and Wolczik demonstrate that even the most defense-oriented discovery statutes to date do not necessarily act as enforcement mechanisms for the Brady rule. In both cases the courts held that the withheld evidence was not Brady material. Only in ato would the application of the relevant discovery statute have required the prosecutor to turn over more evidence to the defense than required under the Agurs reasonable doubt standard.' 3 0
Hence the guilty pleading defendant .is not afforded disclosure of evidence directly affecting his choice between a plea and a trial by the 
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most liberal defense discovery provisions any more than he is afforded such disclosure under the standards delineated in Agurs. Insofar as the trial defendant is concerned, these defense discovery provisions probably have served their purpose of alleviating the prosecutor's burden of compliance with the Brad rule. The guilty pleading defendant, however, is not greatly aided by these provisions where they do not encompass evidence beyond that required to be disclosed under the reasonable doubt standard.
In the majority of jurisdictions, defense discovery privileges are subject to judicial discretion, 3 1 and the defense is required to make some showing of "need,"
13 2 "materiality," "reasonableness," 1 3 3 "good cause," 13 4 or some combination of these. State and federal discovery procedures, as presently administered, are neither intended nor enforced to aid the defendant in making an informed decision whether to plead guilty or stand trial.
IV. APPLICATION OF BR4DY V. MA.RYL,4ND TO PLEA CONVICTIONS
A guilty plea operates as a waiver of the defendant's right to trial and its attendant constitutional safeguards.
I Third, because plea acceptance procedures generally require the judge to satisfy himself that there is a factual basis for the plea, 14 1 the prosecutor's withholding of certain types of exculpatory evidence could erode the factual basis for the plea. Fourth, the due process right conferred by Brady v. Magland can be equated with several rights 142 that are neither waived nor forfeited by a plea of guilty.
A. REQUIREMENT OF AN INTELLIGENT PLEA
The first model states that prosecutorial withholding of material and favorable evidence renders a subsequent plea of guilty unintelligent. This concept conflicts with a trend exemplified by the Brady trilogy 43 and Tollett v. Henderson, 144 which one commentator has characterized as an erosion of the concept of voluntary and intelligent waiver. 145 With the undue emphasis placed on the presence of counsel during plea negotiation in the Brad trilogy and To//eU,' 4 6 an intelligent plea apparently need involve little more than knowledge on the part of the defendant of the charge and the sentence and an awareness that he is foregoing a trial.
These four decisions make a counseled plea virtually immune from collateral attack on traditional waiver grounds. The standard of knowing and intelligent waiver adopted by the Court is sufficiently low as to The rule that a plea must be intelligently made does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every factor entering into his decision. A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the state's case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action.
148
Thus the standard of waiver adopted by the Brady trilogy and Tollett, that a counseled plea is an intelligent plea, is a lower standard than the traditional requirement of voluntary and intelligent waiver ofJohnson v. Zerbst [Vol. 72 seems to ignore the extent of actual knowledge of facts and circumstances relevant to a defendant's decision to plead guilty. The rule of Brady v. Magland and the standard of waiver adopted in the Brady trilogy thus are irreconcilable as applied to the guilty pleading defendant. If the withholding of material and favorable evidence by the prosecutor renders a subsequent plea of guilty unintelligent, the standard of voluntary and intelligent waiver used to gauge the validity of the plea must be the traditional concept of Johnson v. Zerbst.
Two state courts, however, have attempted to reconcile the prosecutorial duty to disclose and the Brady trilogy concept of waiver by holding that prosecutorial withholding of material and favorable evidence renders a guilty plea unintelligent because it detrimentally affects defense counsel's ability to provide competent advice. In Lee v. State,' 56 the trial court denied the defendant's motion to vacate his sentence, 157 after he pleaded guilty to assault with intent to kill. Lee contended that his plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered because the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence that the victim misidentified another man at a lineup prior to the preliminary hearing at which she identified Lee. Relying on a statement by the assistant prosecutor at the hearing on Lee's motion to vacate that constituted a virtual confession of the prosecution's mistake, 158 the Missouri Court of Appeals allowed the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, despite the state's reliance on the Brady trilogy and Tollett for the proposition that a guilty plea waives unknown rights and defenses. 159 The court granted that the plea would be valid if defense counsel knew of the Brady violation prior to the entry of the plea and had nonetheless effectively represented the defendant.16 Nevertheless, the court observed, the combination of the prosecutor's 156 573 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. 1978) . 157 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 27.26 (Vernon 1953) . This section allows a prisoner to move to vacate his sentence on the ground that it violates the Constitution (or the state constitution or laws), that the court lacked jurisdiction, or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
158 At the defendant's rule 27.26 hearing, the assistant prosecutor testified: I did feel that the facts of the misidentification should have been communicated to the defense attorney because I do feel very strongly that the defense cannot recommend a plea of guilty or discuss a plea of guilty with a defendant unless they are aware of factors which might mitigate the case against their clients. 573 S.W.2d at 132.
159 An argument that "unknowable" rights cannot be waived by a guilty plea under the traditional concept of waiver can be found in Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of 'Present But Unknowable" Rights: The Aftermath of the Brad Trilog, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1435 REv. (1974 . 160 There can be no question but that a guilty plea is effective despite a prior violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, provided the defendant and his counsel knew that the violations had occurred and the violations had ceased to have any coercive effect at the time the quality [sic] plea was entered. Also, it cannot be questioned that a guilty plea is binding even though the defendant and his counsel were lacking in some information bearing upon the case, so long as that lack of information was not the result of ineffective legal representation. Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d at 134 (emphasis added).
knowing suppression of exculpatory evidence and the fact that knowledge of that evidence at the time of the plea "reasonably would have led the defendant not to so plead" called for the withdrawal of the plea.
1
The court based its decision on the defense attorney's need for an item of material and favorable evidence that would have enabled him to provide the defendant with informed advice in the decision whether to plead guilty.
Similarly, in Zacek v. Brewer,'
62 petitioner Zacek sought postconviction relief on the ground that his plea to second-degree murder was unintelligent. He argued that the state "artificially restricted" his choice between a plea and trial because the police had willfully suppressed evidence of an illegal search of his home and seizure of shell casings that matched the murder weapon.
1 63 Zacek's attorneys had advised him to plead guilty because they thought that he would be convicted of firstdegree murder if tried. At the postconviction hearing, however, one of the attorneys testified that he never would have recommended a guilty plea had he known that the evidence was illegally seized and thus inadmissible at trial. The Supreme Court of Iowa found that, under Tollett and McMann, Zacek could not obtain relief for a preplea deprivation of a constitutional right unless he could show that his counsel's advice was not within the standards enunciated in those two cases.' 64 The court found that the state's suppression of exculpatory evidence prevented defense counsel from becoming informed of the illegality of the search and therefore prevented counsel from rendering effective assistance to the defendant.16 5 The evidence withheld in Zacek and Lee was obviously exculpatory. The courts need not have concerned themselves with the defense attorneys' inability to render advice to reach the results obtained. A simple application of the Brad v. Maland rule to the facts of each case, even with the Agurs reasonable doubt standard, would have brought about the same result. The courts should not have taken the circuitous steps that they took to relate plain violations of due process to the effectiveness of counsel. Although these steps were necessary to reconcile the Brady trilogy standard of waiver with the prosecutorial duty to disclose, they were inexpedient because the focus of the latter rule is on fairness to the defendant and not on the presence of counsel in bargaining. When the prosecutor unfairly withholds material and favorable evidence from the defense, the ripple effects that this action may have on [Vol. 72 defense counsel's efficacy are a foregone conclusion. Only if the courts accept the proposition that a guilty plea waives all antecedent constitutional defects need the effect of such defects on defense counsel's advice be considered. This argument, which will be discussed in the next section, is that the Brady trilogy was not based on the traditional concept of waiver, and espouses a different concept of how the defendant relinquishes his rights by a plea of guilty. by arguing that the constitutional rights at issue in those cases were not forfeitable because they were not curable. In Blackledge v. Perry, the defendant had been convicted at trial of a misdemeanor and exercised his statutory right to trial de novo. In retaliation, the prosecutor filed a felony charge against Perry for an included offense based on the same conduct. Perry pleaded guilty to the felony charge and then sought postconviction relief for the prosecutor's retaliatory move, asserting that he had been deprived of due process. In Menna v. New York, the defendant pleaded guilty to contempt charges for refusing to testify before a grand jury. Menna was later indicted for refusing to answer questions before the same grand jury, and filed a double jeopardy claim. Professor Westen argues that the incurability of the violation of the due process right to a statutory trial de novo, and of the protection against double jeopardy, stems from the fact that a violation of these rights prevents the state from ever obtaining a valid conviction.'
78 He relies on a statement in Blackledge v. Perry that the claimed right goes "to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him."'
179
Where does the right to prosecutorial disclosure of material and favorable evidence, which is rooted in due process, fit into Westen's scheme of differentiating those rights which are forfeited from those rights which may be asserted after a guilty plea? The remedy for a failure to disclose Brady material no later than at trial is a new trial; thus the state has the opportunity to obtain a conviction on the original charge after providing the defendant with the evidence previously with- 178 Professor Westen's differentiation between curable and incurable constitutional violations may not hold up. Professor Saltzburg argues that the defect in Blackledge was curable in that the prosecutor could have filed a charge that did not include Perry's misdemeanor, and that the defect in Menna could have been cured by denominating the plea a civil contempt. Saltzburg, supra note 140, at 1284-85 nn.89-91.
held. The state's chances of obtaining a conviction upon retrial will be diminished by this evidence, but the power of the state to bring the defendant into court on the original charge is in no way impaired. Therefore, if Westen's model is applied to Brady v. Magland, 180 the defendant's right to prosecutorial disclosure of material and favorable evidence is forfeited by a guilty plea because a claim based on this right does not "forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction."' 8 '
Such an argument, however logical, is purely academic. Surely no judge would refuse to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea in the face of a clear violation of the prosecutor's duty under Brady v. Magland. There are no cases where, given these facts, a judge has refused to set aside a plea by invoking Westen's argument that a Brady violation is an antecedent constitutional violation of no consequence once the defendant has admitted his guilt.
A Florida intermediate appellate court, however, agreed with Westen's view until ordered to reverse itself by the highest court of the state. In State v. Pitts,182 decided before Westen's article was written, the court held that a guilty plea does not cure a Brady defect, reversing its own prior decision that evidence tending to impeach the credibility of witnesses need not be disclosed prior to the entry of the defendants' guilty pleas. The court's prior decision relied on the Brady trilogy for the notion that a guilty plea waives all antecedent nonjurisdictional defects.
183
The theory that a defendant's right to collaterally assert a Brady violation is forfeited by a guilty plea is logically appealing, but to deny a defendant relief in this situation is patently unfair. The forfeiture theory would make the Brady v. Magland rule a nullity for the majority of all convicted criminals because most convictions are obtained through plea negotiations rather than trials.' 8 4 The harshness of Justice White's 180 See text accompanying note 175 supra. Neither Westen nor Saltzburg discusses Brady v.
Magland.
181 Westen, supra note 140, at 1226. 182 249 So. 2d at 49. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the judgment, sentence, and guilty plea. The Florida Supreme Court did not make any determination of the questions of law, relying on the motion in confession of error by the Florida attorney general. 247 So. 2d at 54.
183 249 So. 2d at 48-49. In an unusual opinion, the court reversed itself on equal protection grounds:
Under the requirement of the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions, the benefits of the same rule of law must be accorded all prisoners whose convictions rest on a guilty plea. Accordingly we recede from so much of our opinion as stands for the proposition that a Brady violation is inapplicable where the charges are disposed of by a guilty plea rather than a trial. Conversely stated, we are required to hold by the position taken by the Attorney General that a guilty plea does not cure a Brady defect. Id. at 49.
184 See notes 24-25 & accompanying text supra.
view that a guilty plea is a final determination of factual guilt can be mitigated by reading the Brady rule to hold that the nondisclosure of evidence which factually exculpates the defendant is ground for setting the plea aside.
C. FACTUAL BASIS
The third model is a logical corollary of Justice White's theory of the guilty plea as an admission of guilt. This model states that the plea should be invalidated if the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession at the time of the plea. In short, the prosecution's withholding of evidence which refutes the defendant's admission of guilt vitiates that admission. Therefore, a plea of guilty must have a sound basis in fact.
Many guilty plea acceptance procedures require the trial judge to satisfy himself that there is a factual basis for the plea. The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established.' 87 Thus if a plea of guilty is to function as a final determination of factual guilt, the defendant should be allowed to challenge the validity of his plea by showing that evidence which the prosecution did not disclose 185 Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of insuring that guilty pleas are the product of free and intelligent choice, various state and federal court decisions properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea, and until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.10 (1970) (citations omitted). These defendants have solemnly admitted their guilt, and that being so, we do not care what may have happened to them in the past. The whole purpose of criminal proceedings is to determine whether a defendant is guilty, and once that question is satisfactorily answered in the affirmative, the state's consequent right to incarcerate the defendant is established absolutely. People v. Gott 19 0 exemplifies the operation of the reasonable doubt standard. Because the defense had entered a general request for evidence, the court relied on Agurs for the standard of materiality. Finding that the evidence at issue, the statements of a codefendant, was completely inculpatory, the court held that the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Disclosure of the statements at the time of the plea, the court observed, would not have induced the defendant to go to trial.
1
The reasonable doubt standard does not encompass the entire inquiry a reviewing court must make in assessing the validity of a guilty plea according to the factual basis model. If a guilty plea is to function as an admission of the defendant's guilt, then the nature of the evidence withheld is determinative of the Brady v. Mayland question. The withheld evidence must erode the factual basis for the plea. The insanity defense illustrates this inquiry. In a case of first-degree murder, for instance, evidence of the defendant's insanity at the time of the crime may serve to negate the element of intent. Hence nondisclosure of this evidence would be ground for setting aside a guilty plea to that charge because this evidence destroys the factual accuracy of the plea.
More often, however, an insanity defense is an excuse rather than a complete defense. The defendant admits the requisite act and intent, but claims that his insanity renders him not guilty in that the state cannot punish him. A justification for the crime, such as self-defense, has the same effect as an excuse; both are affirmative defenses. An affirmative defense is complete in the sense that it will prevent the state from obtaining a valid conviction, even if the state can show that the defendant was factually guilty of the crime. Therefore, the model which states that a guilty plea cuts off all claims unrelated to factual guilt would have to allow for Brady v. Magr- land claims that the evidence suppressed by the prosecution would have aided the defendant in the establishment of a legal excuse or a justification for the crime. A guilty plea does not waive rights that would give the defendant a complete defense to the charge, regardless of whether the defendant was aware of these rights at the entry of his plea.
92
Two federal cases illustrate that a complete defense cannot be waived. In Clements v. Coiner, 193 the defendant pleaded guilty to a murder charge. The prosecution withheld the results of a polygraph test and a letter from a psychiatrist, both of which corroborated a theory of the defendant's insanity at the time of the crime (which occurred in 1956). Both of the defendant's lawyers testified at a 1968 evidentiary hearing that the evidence would have materially aided the defense. The district court held that due process demanded that the plea be invalidated, stating:
The possibility of mental defects and the resultant limitations of criminal responsibility raised thereby amply support a determination of materiality ...
A further examination into the petitioner's condition might well have altered the entire course of events, for the prosecution obviously accepted the petitioner's guilty plea knowing that there was a serious question as to petitioner's mental capacity at the time of the alleged crime.
194
In the second case, Fambo v. Smith,195 the evidence withheld by the prosecution clearly proved the impossibility of the defendant's perpetration of the second count of the crime. Fambo was charged with two identical counts of possession of dynamite with intent to use it unlawfully. In exchange for Fambo's plea of guilty, the prosecution dropped the first of these charges. The first count charged the defendant with possession of dynamite with intent to use it unlawfully on November 29, 1970; the second count charged him with the same crime committed on December 1, 1970. Sometime between these two dates, the police found and destroyed the dynamite, replacing the contents of the tubes with sawdust. Thus, Fambo's commission of the second count was impossible. Despite the fact that the assistant district attorney and law enforcement officers were aware of the replacement, no information regarding it was imparted to the defendant and his counsel during plea negotiations. Defense counsel made no request for this evidence. Despite the erosion of the factual basis for the second count, the court denied habeas corpus relief on a finding that Fambo had gotten the benefit of his bar-
gain. 196
The model, which states that a plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt that cuts off all claims unrelated to factual guilt, poses some problems in application. The standard of materiality required by this model is the equivalent of the reasonable doubt standard, which effectively requires the reviewing court to try the case for the first time. 197 Essentially, the Fambo and Clements courts did just that. However, since the trial judge, in accepting a guilty plea, generally does not conduct a penetrating inquiry into the strength of the state's unpresented case when accepting a guilty plea, 98 he cannot know whether the defendant would be able to present evidence sufficient to establish a complete defense but for the Brad violation. Yet the standard of materiality contemplated by the factual basis model and by United States v. Agurs requires the reviewing court to divine the relative strengths of the evidence on either side in assessing the defendant's claim of a Brady violation.
The difficulty of characterizing evidence as representative of a complete or incomplete defense creates a related problem. An incomplete defense may be complete in the sense that it absolutely prevents conviction. For example, a defendant's claim of illegal search and seizure might prevent the state from introducing its principal piece of evidence against him at trial. The state simply would not pursue the prosecution any further. Thus, the defendant constructively has an absolute defense stemming from a procedural claim.
Defenses and procedural rights cannot be neatly catalogued. The question arises whether this differentiation should be attempted for the purpose of deciding which rights are forfeited and which are preserved by a guilty plea. Every piece of evidence, even inculpatory evidence, could be useful to the defense in some way. The variety of possible defenses available to even an obviously guilty defendant and his creative counsel, coupled with the fact that most of the information in the prosecutor's file is not easily pigeonholed, make categorization of evidence for purposes of the factual basis model nearly impossible. Moreover, no differentiation should be attempted because Brady v. Ma1and holds that all nondisclosed evidence favorable to the defendant and material to the issue of guilt or punishment is functionally equivalent. 
D. DUE PROCESS
Three models were discussed that treat Brady material withheld in the context of plea negotiations differently from the same suppression of evidence before a trial. First, a plea of guilty coupled with a Brady violation can be considered unintelligent because defense counsel lacked sufficient information to effectively assist the defendant in making an informed decision how to plead. Second, a claim of preplea suppression of Brady material is forfeited by a guilty plea because a Brady violation is curable in that the state is not barred from obtaining a conviction. Third, Justice White's theory that a guilty plea is an admission of factual guilt which waives all antecedent constitutional violations unrelated to the issue of factual guilt was considered. All of these arguments fail to provide an adequate safeguard of the guilty pleading defendant's right to disclosure because their logically appealing distinctions break down when applied to real cases.
The small percentage of criminal defendants who stand trial are assured, through judicial supervision, the full protection of the procedural rights guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. The majority of defendants, because they are convicted on the basis of their own pleas outside the purview of judges, are denied an adequate safeguard of their right to due process. Only after the defendant is committed to a plea bargain is a formal and largely perfunctory 2°° effort made to assess the validity of the plea. 20° was not brought to the attention of the trial judge who accepted the plea. 2 0 9 The court granted the defendant a writ of habeas corpus, stating: "[Tlhe controlling factor in a procedure where material information in the possession of any state agency is not disclosed to the court is not whether defense counsel knew or should have known about it, but rather whether the procedure as a whole comported with the requirements of due process. ' 208 The psychiatrist had testified at a prior sanity hearing that the defendant was schizophrenic and therefore incompetent to stand trial. Id 209 The psychiatrist's findings evidently were communicated to the police guard and to defense counsel but not to the prosecutor. Id at 220-22.
210 Id at 222. The court found that the defense counsel's personal view that informing the court of the defendant's incompetency would not help the defendant and his consequent nondisclosure of that information violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. In Expcarte Lewis, 220 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that due process demands that Brady v. Magland be equally applied to guilty pleading and trial defendants. Lewis alleged that a psychiatrist's letter, to the effect that he was insane at the time of the crime and was incompetent to stand trial, was not disclosed to his counsel. 22 1 As the letter was obviously material and favorable, under Agurs it should have been disclosed even in the absence of a request. After finding that his newly appointed defense counsel would not have allowed Lewis to plead guilty if he had known of the letter, the court set aside 222 Lewis' guilty plea.
223
The compelling nature of the evidence withheld in each of these cases may have dictated the courts' decisions to apply Brady v. Maryland The decisions of two state courts that have considered the issue of the prosecutor's duty to disclose tactical evidence during plea negotiations are illustrative. In State v. _Pitts,229 the two defendants pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, were tried on the issue of punishment, and received death sentences. Among other grounds urged in a motion to vacate their pleas was the claim that the state suppressed favorable evidence in the form of witnesses' unsigned statements that proclaimed the defendant's innocence and were later repudiated. 230 Confessing error, the Florida attorney general stated that this was a Brady violation because defense counsel might have chosen to go to trial to submit the issue of the witnesses' credibility to a jury had he been aware of their prior statements. Basing its decision on the equal protection clause, the court held that the withholding of evidence which would aid the defense in impeaching the credibility of witnesses violated Brady v. Magland notwithstanding a guilty plea.
23 '
The court in People v. Jones 232 decided the same issue oppositely. The district attorney failed to disclose that the complaining witness had died during plea negotiations, and the defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree robbery. The Court of Appeals of New York decided that the evidence of the complaining witness's death was "highly material to the practical, tactical considerations which attend a determination to plead guilty, but not to the legal issue of guilt itself." 23 3 Thus the court phrased the issue as whether this nondisclosure was so serious as to be a denial of due process, 2 34 given that the prosecutor's concern should be the pursuit of justice and not solely the pursuit of conviction. The court added, however, that it was not a fundamental concern of criminal justice "that a possibly guilty actor shall escape conviction because the People are not able to establish his guilt." 2 3 5 Thus the court held that the prosecutor did not have an affirmative duty to disclose tactical information. In support of its decision, the court noted that the prosecutor need not share the weaknesses of his case with the defendant and quoted Brad v. United States for the proposition that "a defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers. . . that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the state's case." '236 Nevertheless, the court implied that the plea might be set aside in a situation where the same evidence was withheld from a defendant who, unlike Jones, insisted upon his innocence and decided to negotiate a plea because he felt that the prosecution's case was strong enough to assure him a more severe sentence if he chose to go to trial.
237
As the court in People v. Jones recognized, the Constitution assures a criminal defendant his procedural rights, but it does not require that successive and futile efforts be made to acquit him on appeal. The argument for a lowered standard of materiality required of a guilty pleading defendant asserting a Brady v. Maryland violation is not, however, an argument for acquittal at all costs, but rather an argument for due process of law. Although it is the predominant means of conviction, plea bargaining continues to be an informal and unsupervised process. Constitutional safeguards are more honored in the breach in plea negotiation. Professor Alschuler has even suggested that recent increases in the percentage of convictions by negotiated plea are due to the cumbersomeness of trial procedures mandated by the Court's due process revolution. 238 Indeed, the fact that the Court has so burdened the trial with procedural protections while assuming that plea negotiations are conducted fairly is ironic.
In Giles v. Magland, Justice Fortas in his concurring opinion pointed out the further irony that the Court, after setting up a new rule of procedural fairness in Brady v. Matland, burdened that rule with a specific request requirement. 239 Justice Fortas argued that due process required broad disclosure of material and favorable evidence by the (Vol. 72 prosecution. 240 The argument for a lower standard of materiality for a defendant asserting a Brady v. Mayland claim after a plea conviction is essentially a fairness argument. As the Evans v. Kropp court recognized, the question is not so much the importance of the evidence withheld as it is whether the plea negotiations "as a whole comported with the requirements of due process." ' 24 ' The Lewis court called due process of law "the overriding concern" in determining whether the Brady rule was violated in plea negotiations. 242 Moreover, the focus of a Brady inquiry following a plea conviction should be on whether the defendant and his counsel could make an informed choice between a negotiated plea and a trial. In Fambo, the court directed its attention to the choice between a plea and a trial, finding that the defendant's counsel must be able to competently advise him as to the choice. 243 Although it based its holding on the equal protection clause, the court in Pitts found that fairness to the guilty pleading defendant demanded disclosure under Brad v. Marland of even tactical evidence because of its impact on the defendant's decision whether to stand trial. 24 4 The Pitts court alone appears to have adopted a lower standard of materiality for defendants convicted on their pleas, yet the courts deciding the other cases discussed have considered the defendant's decision to plead. The argument for a separate standard of materiality for guilty pleading defendants is grounded generally in the concept of fairness in plea negotiation, and specifically in the defendant's right to an informed choice between a guilty plea and a trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Fairness in plea bargaining clearly cannot be presupposed, as the Court does in Santobello v. New York. 245 Plea bargaining, which emerged in the late nineteenth century as a derivative of urban caretaker politics, 246 continues to be an unstructured, unsupervised yet well-established practice. The guilty pleading defendant's constitutional protections are treated as bargaining chips in negotiation if they are recognized at all. 247 Fairness in plea bargaining can, however, be fostered by a rule that a guilty plea does not cure an antecedent violation of the prosecutorial duty to disclose, and by a more lenient standard of materiality for the defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis of such a violation. Thus the interpretation of the Brad v. United States trilogy 248 that a plea constitutes a waiver of all unknown rights and defenses cannot be maintained because it denies the criminal defendant due process in the conduct of plea negotiation.
In United States v. Agurs,249 the Court held that the standard of materiality to be met by the defendant who has made no request or a general request for material and favorable evidence is whether the nondisclosed evidence would create a reasonable doubt of guilt. The judiciary and commentators have argued cogently that the prosecutor's duty to disclose should not depend on a specific request, which is a needless technical impediment to a rule predicated on fairness to the defendant. 250 Similarly, the reasonable doubt standard is an overly technical requirement that frustrates the purpose of the Brady v. Magland rule in the guilty plea context. The demands of due process would be better served if a more lenient standard of materiality replaced the reasonable doubt standard for the guilty pleading defendant who has made no request or only a general request for Brady material.
2 5 1 The defendant's assertion that material and favorable evidence was withheld prior to the entry of his plea should trigger a lower standard of materiality which would encompass those types of evidence bearing directly upon the defendant's decision whether to plead guilty or to stand trial. This standard reaches beyond the material and favorable evidence that is traditional Brady material, as the latter standard is premised on a trial. Thus the lower standard must necessarily include some evidence which for trial purposes would be denominated tactical or merely cumulative. Brady v. Magland, therefore, should be interpreted to demand prosecutorial disclosure of favorable evidence material either to the issue of guilt or punishment, or to the informed decision to waive the right to trial.
However, the broadened duty to disclose should not impose the burden of sorting through every file on the prosecutor in order to produce evidence which only defense counsel is capable of finding. The demands of the prosecutor's caseload and his adversary posture make the imposition of a new burden inappropriate. Moreover, the Brady rule does not and should not require the prosecutor to prepare the defendant's case for him. The economic realities of the criminal justice system and the growing criminal population dictate that plea bargaining cannot be altogether abolished, as many in the academic community would prefer. 252 The majority of criminal defendants are convicted by their pleas of guilty. These defendants waive their right to trial and its attendant rights, but they do not waive the right to due process of law entirely. They remain entitled to procedural fairness in the conduct of plea negotiations. The practice of plea bargaining can be a fair and legitimate alternative to trial if the rudiments of due process, among which is the Brady v. Mayland rule, were incorporated in the ground rules.
LEE SHEPPARD
252 See note 25 sufira.
